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Introduction
Proposals for the reform of the nation's health care system have
highlighted the issue of rising health care costs. Concern about rising
costs, in turn, has led to talk of imposing price controls on health care
providers.' Economists and other experts have condemned price con-
trols as a way to control rising health care costs.2 They argue that
price controls do nothing to alleviate the underlying causes of infla-
tion; instead, price controls merely postpone or redirect price in-
creases, and in the process introduce allocational distortions and
inefficiencies. This Article will not elaborate on the policy arguments
for or against medical price controls. That task is left to others. In-
stead, this Article is concerned exclusively with a legal question: what,
if any, constitutional limitations apply to the federal government's
power to constrain the prices charged by health care providers? The
specific focus is on physician price controls, but much of the analysis
applies to other health care providers as well.
No claim can be made that physician price controls are per se
unconstitutional under current doctrine. For better or worse, it is
"settled beyond dispute" that regulation of prices is constitutionally
permissible.' This does not mean, however, that the Constitution has
nothing to say about what form a system of physician price controls
could take. This Article argues that the Fifth Amendment's Takings
and Due Process Clauses would apply to any general system of price
controls imposed by the federal government on physician services,
and would establish significant limits on how those controls are for-
mulated and carried out.
1. See, e.g., Dana Priest, Health Care Price Curbs Advocated, WASH. POST, May 1,
1993, at Al; Dana Priest, Medical Price Caps Weighed, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 15,
1993, at Al; Diane Levick, Insurers Shoot at Trial Balloon on Health Care, HARFORD
Cou Nrr, Feb. 12, 1993, at B1.
2. See, e.g., Stuart M. Butler, Rube Goldberg, Call Your Office, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
1993, at A25; Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Health Care is Healing Itself, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1993, at A17; Elizabeth M. McCaughey, Price Controls on Health Care,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1993, at A14; Donna Smith, Economists Oppose Clinton Health Price
Plan, Reuter Business Report, Jan. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES
File (reporting letter signed by 565 economists opposing medical price controls).
3. FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 253 (1987). This conclusion, although
not uncontroversial, has a long lineage. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (upholding
wartime rent controls); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (upholding state regulation of
grain elevator rates).
PHYSICIAN PRICE CONTROLS
In brief, the argument is as follows. First, the Takings Clause ap-
plies to price controls whenever a person has committed significant
specific capital (sunk investment costs) to the price-controlled market,
and it is not feasible to shift that capital to an uncontrolled market.
Physicians make large investments in human capital that cannot be
readily transferred to non-medical markets; thus, if physicians' prices
are constrained by the government in all relevant medical markets,
those price controls are subject to scrutiny under the Takings Clause.
Second, the most appropriate standard for assessing physician
price controls under the Takings Clause is the "fair return" standard
developed by the Supreme Court in public utility rate cases.4 Under
this standard, physicians are entitled to recover their reasonably in-
curred costs, plus a fair return on their investment in medical educa-
tion, training, and equipment. Prices need not be set for each
physician individually; they may be fixed on a group basis by looking
at the costs and fair return requirements of representative members of
the group.5 Given the nonfungible nature of physician services, how-
ever, a highly differentiated system of group rates would be required,
reflecting differences in procedures, training levels, and areas of the
country. Moreover, a procedure for excluding individual physicians
from group rates or reclassifying them as properly belonging to differ-
ent groups would be required.
Third, the Due Process Clause requires that individual physicians
be afforded a hearing on claims that their costs and return require-
ments mandate their reclassification or exclusion from a given group
rate. Although due process generally requires that such a hearing
take place before an individual is deprived of property, a post-depri-
vation hearing in the form of an exemption or variance procedure may
be permissible in this context, provided it is expeditious and includes
relief designed to make physicians whole for losses sustained by being
subjected to inappropriate group price controls.
Cumulatively, these limitations suggest that any system of physi-
cian price controls, if it is to be constitutional, would require the crea-
tion of an elaborate administrative apparatus. Such an apparatus
would have to include economists and health care experts charged
with determining the representative costs and human capital invested
by physicians in different specialties and regions, and the appropriate
return on this investment. It would also require a large cadre of attor-
4. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 310 (1989); Federal Power
Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
5. See The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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neys and hearing officers both to manage generic proceedings setting
group prices and to conduct individual exemption or variance hear-
ings. Whatever else one thinks about the wisdom of price controls,
the administrative costs required to comply with these constitutional
limitations should weigh heavily in deliberations about the proper de-
sign of health care reform. In effect, the constitutionally-mandated
administrative costs present yet another reason to prefer market pric-
ing to administered pricing.
One of the most elusive questions raised by the Clinton Adminis-
tration's reform proposals is how one determines when a system of
health care regulation constitutes a proposal for price controls. The
bill initially sent to Congress by the Administration calls for setting
fees for all physicians providing covered services on a fee-for-service
basis-surely a form of price controls.6 Yet, in public statements
about health reform, the Administration has insisted that it is not en-
dorsing price controls.7 This Article argues that, for constitutional
purposes, the relevant inquiry for identifying a system of price con-
trols subject to constitutional limitations involves two questions. First,
does a proposal authorize actors clothed in governmental authority to
take steps that constrain physician prices? Second, are the physicians
subject to such constrained prices entitled to protection of the Takings
Clause, that is, are they effectively denied access to a market not sub-
ject to government-constrained prices? If these two conditions are
met, then the action in question should be subject to the constitutional
limitations that the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause im-
pose on government price controls.
I. The Takings Clause and Physician Price Controls
There are several potential sources of constitutional limitation on
government price controls, including the Takings Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause in both its substantive
and procedural dimensions. The Supreme Court has held that the
standard of review governing challenges to price controls under sub-
stantive due process and equal protection is a deferential one.8 Thus,
unless the legislation is very poorly conceived or drafted, any substan-
6. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1322(c) (1993).
7. See, e.g., Address of the President to the Joint Session of Congress, Sept. 22, 1993,
reprinted in WHITE HousE DoMEsTsc POLICY COUNCIL, HEALTH SECURITY: TYM PPEsI-
DENT'S REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 97 (1993).
8. See generally Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1988) (citing cases
supporting this conclusion in the context of a challenge to a rent control scheme).
tive due process or equal protection challenge to physician price con-
trols is unlikely to prevail.9 The Takings Clause and the procedural
aspect of due process are more potent constitutional constraints. 10
Accordingly, this Article will focus on those provisions.
The threshold question is whether the Takings Clause applies at
all to a system of physician price controls. The Supreme Court -has
made it clear that the Takings Clause imposes significant limits on the
power of government to regulate certain prices, most prominently, the
rates charged by common carriers and public utilities." On the other
hand, other types of price controls, such as usury laws, have never
been thought to raise questions under the Takings Clause. 2 What we
need then is a theory that tells us which kinds of price controls give
rise to Takings Clause scrutiny, and which kinds do not. The relevant
case law includes two distinct understandings for answering this
threshold question, although they are not recognized as alternatives or
identified by name. The first will be called the legal obligation theory;
the second the specific capital theory. This Part of the Article argues
that the specific capital theory fits much better into the contemporary
understanding of the meaning and purposes of the Takings Clause,
and that a general, federally imposed system of physician price con-
trols should be subject to Takings Clause constraints under that
theory.
A. The Legal Obligation and Specific Capital Theories
The legal obligation theory posits that price controls present a
Takings Clause issue only when someone is subject to a legal obliga-
tion to devote their product or services to the public use. Thus, when
9. In addition to Pennell, Supreme Court cases rejecting substantive due process and
equal protection challenges to price controls include: Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Ad-
kins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to Bituminous Coal
Act price control scheme); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (rejecting substantive
due process challenge to state milk price controls); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S.
138 (1948) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to rent control law).
10. See Tenoco Oil Co. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013, 1020 (1st
Cir. 1989) (concluding that the principal constraint on price controls today is the Takings
Clause).
11. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989); The Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591 (1944); see also FCC v. Florida Power Co., 480 U.S. 245, 255 (1987) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
12. See Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563,569 (1910) (stating that it is "elementary"
that usury laws fall within the police power of the state and present no substantial constitu-
tional question); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitu-
tional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1, 99 (1991).
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the government legally compels persons to devote their property to a
designated use, the government must assure that they receive just
compensation. But when a property owner is legally free to withdraw
from the controlled market, no takings issue is presented. In effect,
the question is whether a person subject to price controls is barred by
law from access to an uncontrolled market.
The specific capital theory focuses not on legal obligations but
economic realities. The question is whether a person has invested
capital in a price-controlled market that has no value, or at best a
substantially reduced value, in any alternative use.'3 To put it another
way, is a person subject to price controls barred as a practical matter
from access to an uncontrolled market? One reason why it may be
economically infeasible to exit a controlled market is that the property
owner has assets that are immovable, like a utility power plant. An-
other reason is that, even if assets are movable, all relevant markets
where they might be employed may be equally controlled. Specific
capital, namely capital that cannot be moved or transferred to an un-
controlled market, is especially vulnerable to expropriation through
price controls, because the owner has little choice but to submit to the
government-imposed price. The only alternative is to abandon the as-
set and forego any recovery of the investment altogether.
Both the legal obligation theory and the specific capital theory
can explain the easy cases-why public utility regulation has tradition-
ally been subject to Takings Clause constraints, and why usury laws
have not been. Under the legal obligation theory, these results follow
because public utilities have a common-carrier obligation to devote
their property to public service, but lenders of money do not. Under
the specific capital theory, these results follow because public utilities
invest heavily in fixed plant assets that cannot be moved to an unregu-
lated jurisdiction; money, in contrast, is the quintessential movable as-
set, which can easily be transferred from one lending market to
another, either within or without a jurisdiction, or, if necessary, can be
directly invested or consumed rather than lent.
13. As one economist has stated, "Asset specificity has reference to the degree to
which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses without sacrifice of productive value.
This has a relation to the notion of sunk cost." Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Eco-
nomic Organization, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORGAN ATION 65, 70 (1988). Perhaps the best-
known application of the concept of specific capital is Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Inte-
gration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297,
298 (1978). For application of the concept to human capital, see Keith N. Hylton & Maria
0. Hylton, Rent Appropriation and the Labor Law Doctrine of Successorship, 70 B.U. L.
Ruv. 821, 833-36 (1990). For an application in the context of eminent domain, see Thomas
W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 ComrnLL L. Rnv. 61, 100 (1986).
Although the legal obligation theory and the specific capital the-
ory both explain the polar cases, in intermediate cases they may lead
to opposite conclusions. Consider, for example, rent controls. Under
the legal obligation theory, rent controls would not be subject to the
Takings Clause unless the owner of a controlled building is legally re-
quired to remain in the rental market, perhaps by an anti-conversion
law.14 Under the specific capital theory, the question would be
whether the building is uniquely suited to the rental market, such that
substantial costs would be incurred in exiting from the rental market
and converting to some other use. If the answer is yes, as it often
would be, then the specific capital theory would require that the Tak-
ings Clause be applied to rent controls.
B. The Weakness of the Legal Obligation Theory
The legal obligation theory finds support in Bowles v. Willing-
ham,'5 a Supreme Court decision dealing with emergency World War
II rent controls. In the course of addressing a variety of constitutional
challenges to these controls, Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court
stated: "We are not dealing here with a situation which involves a 'tak-
ing' of property.' 6 In support of this statement, Justice Douglas ob-
served that under the statute, owners of rental units were legally free
to withdraw their units from the rental market.'7
Lower courts have occasionally relied on Bowles for the proposi-
tion that the Takings Clause does not apply to price controls unless
one is legally obligated to serve the controlled market. For example,
the Takings Clause was held to have no application to commodity
price ceilings imposed by the Nixon Administration based on this
reading of Bowles.'" Similarly, and closer to home, several lower
courts have rejected takings challenges to price caps imposed by Con-
14. See, e.g., Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989).
15. 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
16. Id. at 517.
17. Id. In Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), a companion case arising under
the same statute, the Court noted that the "present statute is not open to the objection that
petitioners are compelled to serve the public as in the case of a public utility ..... Id. at
437.
18. Western States Meat Packers Ass'n, Inc. v. Dunlop, 482 F.2d 1401, 1403-05 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1973). Notwithstanding this decision, other courts construed the Nixon
price controls to contain an implicit standard of "fairness and equity" which is not dissimi-
lar to the fair return requirement of the public utility cases decided under the Takings
Clause. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737,
757 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge court). Other decisions emphasized the ability to seek
particularized relief in case of individual hardship, also a feature that would be required
under a takings analysis. See Pacific Coast Meat Jobbers Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council,
PHYSICIAN PRICE CONTROLS 641
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gress under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 9 IWo of these de-
cisions specifically rely on Bowles for the proposition that such price
caps present no issue under the Takings Clause because providers re-
main legally free to forego treating patients covered by Medicare and
Medicaid and may therefore continue to practice their specialties
without being subject to any controls.20
Whether the cryptic passage in Bowles was actually meant to en-
dorse the legal obligation theory is questionable.21 But even if this is
the proper reading of Bowles, the legal obligation theory is hard to
square with other settled understandings of modem Takings Clause
jurisprudence. Cumulatively, these discordant elements strongly sug-
gest that the specific capital theory provides a better fit with the domi-
nant understanding of the clause.
481 F.2d 1388, 1391 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973); United States v. Lieb, 462 F.2d 1161,
1167 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1972).
19. See Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.) (upholding "limiting charge" regu-
lation of physician charges under Medicare Part B), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 78 (1993);
Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 972 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding temporary rate freeze
under Medicare Part B); Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care Facilities v. Minnesota Dep't of
Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding state limitation on reimburse-
ment of nursing homes that receive Medicaid), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); see also
Burditt v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 934 F.2d 1362, 1376 (5th Cir.
1991) (upholding against takings challenge a requirement that Medicare providers treat all
persons who seek services in emergency rooms).
20. See Garelick, 987 F.2d at 916 ("A property owner must be legally compelled to
engage in price-regulated activity for regulations to give rise to a taking." (citing Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1944))); Whitney, 780 F.2d at 972.
21. Several comments in the opinion suggest that the Court was simply rejecting the
argument that emergency rent controls are a per se taking, but was not eliminating the
possibility that they might constitute a taking as applied in particular circumstances. For
example, immediately after the statement that the Court was "not dealing ... with a situa-
tion which involves a 'taking' of property," Bowles, 321 U.S. at 517, Justice Douglas cited
and relied on Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), the
leading decision establishing the fair return standard for public utilities under the Takings
Clause. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 517. Moreover, at the end of the same paragraph Justice
Douglas quoted Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921), for the proposition that property
rights are not "exempt" from legislative modification, as evidenced in part by the power of
eminent domain, which allows takings of property for just compensation. Bowles, 321 U.S.
at 517-18. Finally, Justice Douglas observed that just because "property may lose utility
and depreciate in value as a consequence of regulation," this has not been "a barrier to the
exercise of the police power." Id. Together, these comments suggest that the Court was
rejecting the idea that the Takings Clause bars all rent controls, but not holding that the
Takings Clause has no application to such controls at all.
Bowles is also distinguishable by the fact that the scheme upheld by the Court was
established under the War Power and was based on the emergency caused by a sudden
shortage of housing created by the rapid expansion of defense production in certain areas
of the country. The Court indicated that a more relaxed standard of review was appropri-
ate in these circumstances. Id. at 519; see also Yakus, 321 U.S. at 431-32 (noting the need
for Congress to take "practicable and expeditious" steps during wartime).
PHYSICIAN PRICE CONTROLS
1. Bowles Rests On Outmoded History
First of all, the legal obligation theory appears to be based on an
outmoded understanding of why the Takings Clause applies to public
utility rate regulation. The legal obligation idea can be traced to a
series of decisions rendered in the late nineteenth century, when the
Court first held that the Takings Clause constrains state regulation of
railroad rates. 2 At the time, the Takings Clause was thought to apply
only to formal exercises of the power of eminent domain and to
closely related government actions, such as the physical occupation or
destruction of property. 3 Accordingly, when the Court held first that
the clause imposes limits on state railroad rate regulation, it analo-
gized rate regulation to eminent domain.24 Just as the government
may not take legal title to property for a public use without paying just
compensation, the Court reasoned, so the government may not force a
utility by law to devote its property to public use without just compen-
sation.' Consistent with the analogy, in 1897 the Court held in Smyth
v. Ames26 that just compensation had to be measured by the current
"fair value" of the property devoted to public use.27
The fair value regime established by Smyth v. Ames was subject
to widespread criticism, most prominently by Justice Brandeis in his
seminal concurring opinion in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tele-
22. See generally John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitu-
tional Limits on Utility Rate Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REv. 65, 70-81 (1985) (recounting
history).
23. See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269,275-76 (1897) (noting that an "'im-
mense weight of authority"' supported the view that there had to be a "'physical invasion
of the real estate"' in order for a taking to occur (quoting Transportation Co. v. Chicago,
99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878))).
24. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898) ("The corporation may not be re-
quired to use its property for the benefit of the public without receiving just compensation
for the services rendered by it."); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 410
(1894) ("If the State were to seek to acquire the title to these roads under its power of
eminent domain, is there any doubt that constitutional provisions would require payment
to the corporation of just compensation .... Is it any less a departure from the obligations
of justice to seek to take not the title but the use for the public benefit at less than its
market value?"); The Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886) ("Under pretence
of regulating fares and freights, the State cannot require a railroad corporation to carry
persons or property without reward; neither can it do that which in law amounts to a taking
of private property for public use without just compensation, or without due process of
law.").
25. Perhaps the fullest exposition of the analogy is found in Justice Brewer's influen-
tial circuit court decision in Ames v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 64 F. 165, 176-78 (C.C.D. Neb.
1894), affid sub nom. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
26. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
27. Id at 544.
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phone Co. v. Public Service Commission.' Among other things, Jus-
tice Brandeis specifically attacked the eminent domain analogy that
underlay the fair value methodology. The root of the problem, he
stressed, was that the "property" ultimately at stake was the capital
that the shareholders had invested in the utility. Thus, the focus of the
inquiry should not be on the current value of the utility's physical
plant "taken" by the government for public use, but rather on the
"amount prudently invested in [the utility]" by its investors.29
As is well known, Brandeis' views eventually triumphed in Fed-
eral Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,30 decided shortly
before Bowles. In effect, then, the comments in Bowles were already
an atavism at the time they were uttered. Under the regime of Smyth
v. Ames, which rested on an analogy between rate regulation and emi-
nent domain, it made sense to condition the application of the Takings
Clause on a finding that one had a legal obligation to serve the public.
But after the Smyth approach was dethroned in Hope, and the Court
adopted a standard that focused on fairness to investors, the basis for
finding that the Takings Clause applies was radically altered. The Tak-
ings Clause was no longer seen as protecting against certain kinds of
physical appropriations by the government, but rather as a promise by
the government that shareholders will not have their investment-
backed expectations frustrated by regulators. Although the Court in
Hope did not directly endorse the specific capital theory, its analysis is
far more consistent with that approach than with the legal obligation
idea.31
2. Bowles Is Contrary to Modern Regulatory Takings Doctrine
The legal obligation theory of Bowles is also inconsistent with
more general developments in Takings Clause law, in particular the
emergence of modern regulatory takings doctrine. The watershed
regulatory takings case was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,3 2 where
the Court held that the Takings Clause not only forbids the physical
appropriation or destruction of property, but also means that "if regu-
lation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.133 There was no
28. 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
29. Id.
30. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
31. This was confirmed by The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968),
where the Court applied the fair return standard of Hope in circumstances where the regu-
lated entity was legally free to abandon the controlled market. See infra note 62.
32. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
33. Id. at 415.
suggestion in Mahon that the coal company was subject to a legal obli-
gation to mine coal. To the contrary, the Takings Clause was brought
into play because the assets in question-pillars of coal in deep
mines-were valuable to the company only in mining operations and
would have no value to the company in any other use. At least implic-
itly, therefore, the Court accepted the specific capital theory.
Nor is there anything in the regulatory takings cases that follow
upon Mahon to suggest that a property owner must show a legal obli-
gation to serve the public before the Takings Clause is triggered. Most
of these cases involve land use regulations that are alleged to be so
burdensome that they amount to a taking of the owner's property.
34
The Supreme Court has never suggested in these cases that if the land
owner is legally free to transfer the land from its current use to some
alternative use, this defeats any claim of a taking. To the contrary, the
assumption is that the burden of the regulation is measured against
any use of the property that was legally permitted at the time specific
capital improvements were made." In effect, regulatory takings doc-
trine, which has been developed largely in the period after Bowles,
implicitly adopts a specific capital theory for the application of the
Takings Clause-not a legal obligation theory.36
34. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (regula-
tion of development of beachfront property); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987) (development exaction); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedic-
tis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (mandatory support of surface property by coal mining operator);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (historic preservation
ordinance).
35. For example, zoning ordinances that eliminate nonconforming uses have always
been understood to present a serious problem under the Takings Clause because they may
require the destruction or extensive modification of specific capital. See ROGER A. CUN-
NiNGHAM ET AT., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 543 (1984). The problem is especially acute with
ordinances that prohibit nonconforming structures. As one commentary has explained:
"Most of the investment in a nonconforming structure is 'sunk.' A sunk cost is a cost that a
firm will not be able to recover when it goes out of business. When a building is torn down,
its salvage value is often close to zero." SHELDON F. KURrZ & HERBERT HovnNIAW,
AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 959 (1987). Not surprisingly, therefore, some courts have held
that uncompensated prohibition of nonconforming uses is an unconstitutional taking. See
Ailes v. Decatur County Area Planning Comm'n, 448 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1100 (1984). Others have held that nonconforming uses may be eliminated if they
are phased out (amortized) over a reasonable period of time, permitting recovery of the
owner's specific capital. See, e.g., Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255
(N.Y. 1977). In either event, there is general judicial recognition of the need to protect
specific capital.
36. Regulatory takings cases not involving land use controls are consistent with this
observation. For example, the Court in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155 (1980), struck down an attempt by the state to authorize courts to retain interest
earned on funds deposited by litigants in interpleader cases. The withholding of interest
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3. Rent Control Cases Have Not Followed Bowles
The apparent endorsement of a legal obligation theory in Bowles
does not even appear to have been applied in the very area at issue in
that case-rent controls. Rent control cases preceding Bowles do not
support the doctrine. In the leading decision of the World War I era,
Block v. Hirsh,37 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, stressed
that the controls were temporary, and contained "[m]achinery"
designed to "secure to the landlord a reasonable rent.' '38 The Court
concluded:
The only matter that seems to us open to debate is whether the
statute goes too far. For just as there comes a point at which the
police power ceases and leaves only that of eminent domain, it
may be conceded that regulations of the present sort pressed to
a certain height might amount to a taking without due process of
law.
39
In effect, the Court strongly intimated that the principles of the Tak-
ings Clause govern rent controls, forbidding controls that would deny
the owner a reasonable return on investment.
Indeed, in a somewhat cryptic passage, Block v. Hirsh appears
specifically to reject the legal obligation theory. The landlord in that
case sought to distinguish Munn v. Illinois,4° which upheld state regu-
lation of prices charged by grain elevators, on the ground that "a grain
elevator may go out of business whereas here the use is fastened upon
the land."'41 Holmes rejected the distinction, noting that "[t]he power
to go out of business, when it exists, is an illusory answer to gas com-
panies and waterworks .... "42 The point, presumably, was that even
if a gas or water company was legally free to exit the market, this
would do nothing to protect its specific assets from expropriation
through price controls.43
was held to be a taking, even though there was no suggestion that litigants were legally
obligated to use state interpleader proceedings to resolve their disputes. See id. at 156-57.
37. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
38. Id. at 157.
39. Id. at 156.
40. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
41. Block, 256 U.S. at 157.
42. Id.
43. Other cases of this era also appear to assume that the Takings Clause prohibits
price controls that do not assure a reasonable return on investment, without respect to
whether the controlled entity is subject to a legal obligation to serve the market. See High-
land v. Russell Car Co., 279 U.S. 253, 258 (1929) (upholding the Lever Act, permitting the
president to fix the maximum price on coal during wartime, but stressing that plaintiff did
not allege that the price was not compensatory or that it failed to give him a reasonable
profit); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 250 (1922) (upholding against
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Similarly, two recent cases involving rent controls contain no sug-
gestion that the Takings Clause would not apply to such controls if the
owner were free to abandon the rental market. In Pennell v. City of
San Jose," the Court held that a rent control ordinance that allowed
regulators to take tenant hardship into account was not facially invalid
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.45 But the Court
discussed separately the contention that the ordinance violated the
Takings Clause. The Court declined to resolve this contention be-
cause it found that the claim was premature in the absence of any
evidence that the tenant hardship clause had ever been relied on in
fixing rents.46 Significantly, however, there was no suggestion that
Bowles had rendered the Takings Clause inapplicable to rent control
statutes where the owner was free to leave the market. Nor is it possi-
ble that the Court was unaware of Bowles, because the Court explic-
itly relied on that decision in the portion of its opinion discussing the
Due Process and Equal Protection challenges.47
More recently, in Yee v. City of Escondido,48 the Court enter-
tained another challenge to a rent control ordinance under the Tak-
ings Clause. The Court held that a system of rent controls on mobile
home lots, in conjunction with a rule preventing the landowner from
selecting new tenants, did not constitute a per se taking of the owner's
property.49 Nevertheless, the Court indicated that the scheme would
be open to a takings challenge as applied, although it ultimately con-
cluded that this issue had not been presented in the petition for certio-
rari.50 Again, there was no suggestion that Bowles had rendered the
Takings Clause irrelevant to rent controls if the owner was legally free
to abandon the market; the Court's decision would make no sense if
this had been its understanding.
Recent lower court decisions also have rejected the notion that a
Takings Clause issue is presented if a property owner is legally free to
exit the market or abandon the property. The First Circuit declined to
rely on Bowles in rejecting a takings challenge to wholesale gasoline
price controls imposed in Puerto Rico, noting that the "supposed free-
vagueness challenge a standard requiring "just and reasonable rent" and noting the similar-
ity to the language of the Takings Clause).
44. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
45. Id. at 11-15.
46. Id. at 9-10.
47. Id. at 13.
48. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
49. Id. at 1528-31.
50. Id. at 1531-34.
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dom to temporarily leave the market may be largely illusory."'" Simi-
larly, the New Jersey Supreme Court has condemned as "fictitious"
the notion that the owner of a rental apartment building is free to
abandon the market.5 2 The court observed: "Although in theory the
owner of a large apartment building may convert it to other uses or
tear it down and construct something else in its place, in practice such
a course is ordinarily economically prohibitive, and to force it would
be confiscatory."-3
4. The Legal Obligation Theory Conflicts With Accepted Takings
Clause Policy
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the legal obligation theory
finds little support in the general purposes of the Takings Clause. The
Court has frequently observed that the central purpose of the Takings
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole. '54 In other words, the Clause prohibits targeted
forms of redistribution that unfairly single out one group or segment
of society to bear costs that should be spread more widely. It is diffi-
cult to see how this concern would apply only where there is a legal
obligation to serve the market. To the contrary, the sense of unfair
redistribution potentially posed by price controls arises only because
persons subject to controls have specific capital at risk, and are there-
fore vulnerable to expropriation. A legal obligation not accompanied
by such an effect would hardly be said to give rise to any perception of
unfairness at all.55
51. Tenoco Oil Co. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013, 1027 n.21 (1st
Cir. 1989).
52. Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 350 A.2d 1, 14-15 n.9 (N.J. 1975).
53. Id.
54. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). For recent cases relying on
this statement of purpose, see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S.
211, 227 (1986); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978);
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988).
55. Academic theories about the purposes of the Takings Clause also provide no sup-
port for limiting the Clause to circumstances where a property owner is legally constrained
from leaving the market. One theory posits that the Clause is designed to assure efficient
decisions about government resource acquisition by avoiding the "fiscal illusion" associ-
ated with thinking that government may acquire scarce resources for free. See Thomas W.
Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 1561, 1583-84
(1986) (citing authorities). Clearly, this concern is present when resources in the form of
specific assets are vulnerable to government appropriation, as well as when resources are
legally restricted to a given market.
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The only purpose that adoption of the legal obligation theory
would serve is a reduction in litigation costs. Identifying a legal obli-
gation to serve the public undoubtedly entails a more formalistic anal-
ysis than identifying specific capital and hence is presumably a
cheaper rule to apply. For example, determining whether an entity
has a common carrier obligation presents a legal question that can be
determined in most cases without an evidentiary hearing. But the
legal obligation theory is seriously underinclusive in the sense that it
would leave unprotected a large number of property owners who are
vulnerable to expropriation through price controls. The question then
is whether the potential savings in litigation costs justifies the greater
potential for injustice in the form of unfair redistributions. Generally
speaking, a reduction in litigation costs has not been sufficient reason
to support contraction of constitutional rights,5 6 and this has been the
conclusion reached under the Takings Clause as well, as witnessed by
expansion of the Clause beyond physical takings to include regulatory
takings.
In sum, although the legal obligation theory finds arguable sup-
port in Bowles, a decision resting in large part on the War Power, it is
seriously at odds with major developments in Takings Clause jurispru-
dence in the last half century. The specific capital theory provides a
far better fit with modem law, and should be used in determining
A second theory stresses that the Takings Clause functions like an insurance policy,
protecting property owners against the risk of loss through government appropriation. Id.
at 1580-81 (citing authorities). This rationale also applies to specific capital as well as prop-
erty legally obligated to serve a particular market.
A third theory, related to the second, stresses the "demoralization costs" that occur
when property-owning minorities are forced to make disproportionate sacrifices imposed
on them by the majority. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1214 (1967). This too justifies no distinction between the legal obligation and specific capi-
tal ideas.
Finally, some commentators have attempted to ground the Takings Clause in public
choice theory, either by stressing the role of the clause in discouraging rent seeking in the
form of attempts by groups to use the government to appropriate the property of others,
see RicHARD A. EPsTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DoMAIN (1985); Merrill, supra, at 1577-78, or by stressing the concerted opposition that
property owners might present to government projects that require the use of their prop-
erty if they were not compensated. Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Com-
pensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125 (1992). Obviously, neither of these concerns is
limited to circumstances where there is a legal obligation to serve the market, but would
apply anytime a property owner has specific assets at risk.
56. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974) (stating
that "conservation of the taxpayers' purse" is ordinarily not a sufficient reason for burden-
ing protected rights).
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whether any particular system of price controls is subject to the Tak-
ings Clause.
C. Physician Investments in Specific Human Capital
There can be little doubt that price controls on physicians should
be subject to the Takings Clause under the specific capital theory.
Physicians make huge investments in specialized training and equip-
ment. This investment initially includes the direct costs of medical
school, such as tuition and fees. More importantly, it also includes the
opportunity costs of foregone earnings and leisure incurred during the
long and arduous process of medical training.57 Together, these direct
outlays and opportunity costs constitute a major investment in human
capital.58
This investment in human capital is also unquestionably specific
capital in the sense that it would have little or no value if not devoted
to the practice of medicine.5 9 Physician human capital is obviously
57. In addition, of course, there are costs associated with acquiring office space and
the necessary equipment to engage in the practice of medicine. The costs of setting up a
practice upon graduation from medical school are also considerable. See Charles D. Bank-
head, Solo Practice, MED. WORLD NEWS, June 11, 1990, at 31 (stating that the costs of
setting up a practice approach $100,000); Carol B. Golin, Medical Practice Trends: Starting
Up Solo-What it Takes Today, 5 J. oF MED. PR c. Moamrr. 24, 24 (1989) (stating that
setting up a family practice requires $50,000 initially and up to $6,000 to cover monthly
expenses); see also Arthur Owens, Starting Out: Success Is A Longer Reach These Days,
MED. ECON., Jan. 11, 1993, at 164 (reporting that 41% of physicians require five years or
more to repay practice start-up loans).
58. In 1991-92, the median annual tuition for a public medical school was $6,826 and
was $19,790 for a private medical school. American Medical Association, Report of the
Council on Medical Education Regarding Ways to Reduce the Cost of Medical School
Education 1 (unpublished report on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
Undoubtedly the largest element of investment, however, is the opportunity costs associ-
ated with a medical education, that is, the foregone earnings and leisure a medical student
gives up during- medical education and training. Unfortunately, there appears to be no
general study regarding the opportunity costs of a medical education. One court, however,
seeking to determine the value of medical degree as part of a division of property upon
divorce found that a married couple lost $250,000 in net earnings while the husband at-
tended medical school. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 754 P.2d 1333, 1334 (Alaska 1988). This figure
does not include foregone leisure time, and would probably range higher in more urban
markets. If physician fees are to be fixed by some type of government regulation, an accu-
rate measure of opportunity costs would have to be developed in order to assure a fair
return on total physician investment in human capital. Significant administrative costs
would undoubtedly be associated with such an undertaking.
59. This common sense perception is not new. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 121-22 (1889) (noting that practice of medicine requires "years of study and great
learning for [its] successful prosecution" and that the interest or "estate" in continuing that
practice "is often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken").
not completely immovable, like a power plant or railroad right-of-
way. Thus, if physician price controls were imposed by local or even
state governments, physicians could relocate to other jurisdictions
without controls.6° Of course, for physicians with established prac-
tices who have accumulated extensive patient good will, even this op-
tion would likely entail a serious sacrifice. When controls are imposed
or mandated at a federal level, however, there can be no doubt that
physician investment must be regarded as specific capital. The only
escape from federally mandated price controls would be expatriation,
a step that for most physicians would be too drastic to contemplate.
Physician human capital can also be shifted, within limits, from
one segment of the medical market to another. For this reason, deci-
sions upholding price caps on Medicaid and Medicare reimburse-
ment61 are arguably justified under the specific capital theory, at least
if Medicaid and Medicare patients represent only a small portion of
the relevant market for a given specialty. Again, however, this qualifi-
cation does not apply to any proposal for a general federal regime of
physician price controls. Such a regime would eliminate access to any
uncontrolled market in the United States. It would thus place the ex-
tensive specific human capital of physicians directly at risk of expro-
priation, and would trigger the application of the Takings Clause.62
D. The Relevance of Professional Licensure
There is a further argument that might be invoked in support of
the proposition that the Takings Clause ought not apply to physician
price controls. Physicians obtain licenses to practice medicine from
the state-licenses that are necessary to engage in the practice of
60. Even if individual physicians did not relocate, local jurisdictions would be con-
strained in setting controlled prices by the fact that new physicians would be reluctant to
locate in a price controlled jurisdiction. The resulting threat of a doctor shortage would
temper the severity of the regulation. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use
Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 473,
506-28 (1991).
61. See cases cited supra note 19.
62. In The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), the Court placed
great weight on the fact that gas producers could escape federal controls by seeking au-
thority from the Federal Power Commission to abandon the price-regulated interstate mar-
ket and serve only the intrastate market. Id. at 772-73. The Commission had indicated
that this authority would be freely granted. Id. at 773. Even so, the Court indicated that
the fair return requirement from the Takings Clause governed its inquiry. Id. at 790-92. A
system of physician price controls designed to preclude any access to an uncontrolled mar-
ket presents far more serious takings questions.
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medicine.6 3 Economists have long argued that such licensing pro-
grams can be used to restrict entry into a profession and thus allow
incumbent practitioners to earn monopoly rents. 64 Accordingly, an
argument might be made that the Takings Clause should not apply to
physician price controls because these controls simply compensate for
the monopoly rents created by government licensing.65
The assumptions of the argument are debatable at best. Few ob-
servers believe that the rapid rise in medical costs in recent years has
been caused by government restrictions on the supply of doctors.66
Instead, rising prices are primarily a function of high demand for phy-
sician services, fueled in part by government subsidies of health care
expenditures and health insurance, and in part by the rapid introduc-
tion of new technologies.67
But even if it were true that government licensing laws have re-
stricted the supply of physicians, it would not follow that the Takings
Clause is irrelevant to physician price controls. After all, the Takings
Clause clearly applies to public utility price controls, and public utili-
ties are typically granted explicit monopoly rights in the form of a
certificate of public convenience and necessity.68 Indeed, as the public
utility example suggests, the solution to the potential abuses of mo-
nopoly power created by government licensure is not to give the gov-
ernment unrestrained power of regulation. Instead, it is to adopt a
system of regulation that seeks to protect both the consumer interest
in avoiding monopoly prices and the investor interest in being given
an opportunity to earn a fair return on investment.69
63. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2050-2051 (West 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. oh.,
225 para. 60/3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); see generally Timothy S. Jost, The Necessary and Proper
Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REv. 525 (1988).
64. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 6, 13-18 (1976).
65. Similar arguments have been made in support of mandatory pro bono obligations
for lawyers. See Jennifer G. Brown, Rethinking "The Practice of Law," 41 EMORY L.J. 451,
454-55 (1992). For criticism, see Jonathan R. Macey, Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for
the Poor or Welfare for the Rich?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1115, 1121-22 (1992).
66. See generally Macey, supra note 65, at 1121-22 (making a similar observation about
the supply of lawyers).
67. HENRY J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION: FINANCING AMERICA'S
HEALTH CARE 9, 12, 39-40, 49, 53, 60 (1991); Randall R. Boubjerg, Competition Versus
Regulation in Medical Care: An Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REv. 965, 965-73
(1981). On the role of new technologies, see Joseph P. Newhouse, An Iconoclastic Vew of
Health Cost Containment, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 152.
68. 1 A.J.G. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 347-77 (1969).
69. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
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H. The Appropriate Takings Standard
Given that the Takings Clause applies to any general, federal sys-
tem of physician price controls, the next question concerns what legal
standard should be used in determining the constitutionality of any
such system of controls under the Clause. Here again, there are two
dominant options: the ad hoc multipart balancing test applied by the
Supreme Court in regulatory takings cases, and the fair return stan-
dard developed by the Court for use in public utility rate cases.
A. Ad Hoc Balancing or Fair Return: Determining the Appropriate
Standard
The first option, the regulatory takings balancing standard, traces
its modern form to the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.70 It requires that courts ex-
amine three factors: the economic impact of the regulation at issue,
the "investment-backed expectations" of those affected, and the char-
acter of the governmental action.71 The standard contemplates an "ad
hoc, factual" inquiry into the application of these factors in each par-
ticular case.7' Since 1978, this regulatory takings standard has been
applied predominantly in land use cases, 73 but has also been employed
in a diverse range of takings controversies involving, among other
things, regulation of trade secrets,74 pensions,75 and welfare benefits.
76
The second option, the fair return standard, has been developed
in the public utility context and dates from the Court's decision in
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.77 That standard
permits regulators to consider both consumer and investor interests,
and to set rates within a zone of reasonable outcomes.78 At a mini-
70. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The ad hoc nature of the inquiry was anticipated by
Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
71. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
72. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) (quoting
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
73. See cases cited supra note 34.
74. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984).
75. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986).
76. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 606-07 (1987).
77. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). Hope did not mandate that regulators use a fair return on
original investment approach; it simply required that the "total effect" of the rate order be
just and reasonable. Id. at 602. Nevertheless, state and federal regulators have uniformly
responded to the decision by adopting the fair return on original investment approach
advocated by Justice Brandeis. See 1 ALfRED E. KAHN, TnE ECONOMICS OF REGULA-
TVON: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTUTIONS 39.41 (1970).
78. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989); Hope, 320 U.S. at
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mum, however, the standard requires that rates be set at a level that
permits the utility "to operate successfully, to maintain its financial
integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risk
assumed ... ."19 Thus, the fair return standard generally requires that
a utility be given an opportunity to recover all its reasonably incurred
costs and to earn a fair return on all its prudentially made investment.
As the Court explained in its most recent decision in this area, Du-
quesne Light Co. v. Barasch,0 a regulated utility "is entitled to such
rates as will permit it to earn a return.., equal to that generally being
made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on
investments in other business undertakings which are attended by cor-
responding risks and uncertainties. 81
The Supreme Court has not spoken to the question of what stan-
dard should apply to price controls outside the public utility context,
and it is not inconceivable that the Penn Central regulatory takings
test would ultimately be adopted as the measure of the constitutional-
ity of physician price controls.82 For a variety of reasons, however, the
fair return standard provides a much better benchmark.
First and most obviously, the fair return standard is designed for
the specific purpose of assessing the constitutionality of price controls.
Accordingly, the fair return standard addresses the factors that would
be of greatest concern in assessing a system of physician price con-
trols. These include the interest of consumers in avoiding excess
charges and the interest of providers in earning a return on investment
"commensurate with the returns on investments in other enterprises
having corresponding risks."83 The regulatory takings standard, in
contrast, offers little guidance for reconciling these concerns. More-
over, the fair return standard has proven to be adaptable to schemes
for establishing maximum charges for large numbers of similarly-situ-
ated producers, while tailoring those controls to relevant differences
79. Hope, 320 U.S. at 605; see Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 314; The Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790-92 (1968).
80. 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
81. Id. at 314-15 (quoting Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692 (1923)).
82. A number of federal district courts have applied this standard in assessing takings
challenges to rent controls. See, e.g., Rent Stabilization Ass'n, Inc. v. Dinkins, 805 F. Supp.
159 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 5 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993); Richardson v. City of Honolulu, 802
F. Supp. 326 (D. Haw. 1992); Gibbs v. Southeastern Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D.
Conn. 1989); Tirolerland, Inc. v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 304
(N.D.N.Y. 1984).
83. Hope, 320 U.S. at 603.
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among producers.' In contrast, the regulatory takings standard, be-
cause of its ad hoc nature, might prove to be unworkable if applied to
a large-scale system of controls on physician prices.
Second, the fair return standard reflects a century of Supreme
Court litigation over rate regulation and, in its current form, has re-
mained stable for nearly fifty years.85 The standard has withstood the
test of time and proven its workability in countless rate proceedings
before state and federal regulatory agencies and courts. In contrast,
the regulatory takings balancing test dates in its modern form only
from 1978, and it is not clear that it enjoys the full support of the
current Supreme Court, especially Justice Scalia.86
Third, although the Supreme Court has never addressed whether
the regulatory takings standard applies to price controls outside the
public utility context, lower courts are turning increasingly to the fair
return standard in these circumstances. For example, the fair return
standard has recently been applied to state initiatives to cap or roll
back auto insurance ratesY In addition, state supreme courts in re-
cent years have adopted the fair return standard in examining the con-
stitutionality of municipal rent control schemes. 88
84. See Permian Basin, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), discussed infra at text accompanying notes
91-94.
85. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) (reaffirming Federal
Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591 (1944)).
86. Justice Scalia generally disapproves of multi-factored, ad hoc balancing tests be-
cause they lead to unequal treatment and deprive the law of desired predictability.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 1175, 1178-79
(1989). Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), which recognizes a new "categorical rule" for government action
that deprives an owner of all economic value in property, is consistent with this general
antipathy to balancing.
87. See, e.g., Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990) (striking
down Nevada statute freezing auto insurance rates because it failed to guarantee a fair
return to insurance companies); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989)
(striking down portion of a California initiative freezing automobile insurance rates be-
cause it failed to guarantee a fair return to insurers); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
State, 590 A.2d 191 (NJ. 1991) (upholding New Jersey regulation of automobile insurance
rates under fair return standard).
88. See, e.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976) (applying public
utility standard and striking down municipal rent control amendment as not assuring a fair
return to property owners); Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 394 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1978)
(striking down municipal rent control ordinance for failing to provide procedures neces-
sary to guarantee fair return to landlords); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 350
A.2d 1, 14-16 (NJ. 1975) (reviewing precedents and concluding that municipal rent control
ordinances should be assessed under public utility rate standards); Jeffery v. McCullough,
652 P.2d 9, 12 (Wash. 1982) (applying fair return standard in upholding ordinance regulat-
ing moorage fees charged to floating home owners).
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In sum, considerations of policy, history, and lower court prece-
dent all suggest that the fair return standard is a more appropriate
benchmark for assessing the constitutionality of physician price con-
trols under the Takings Clause.
B. The Effect of Group Price Controls
Regulators typically apply the fair return standard to each indi-
vidual regulated entity on an individual basis. In some circumstances,
however, the Supreme Court has permitted rates or prices to be set on
an area or group basis.89 In effect, rates are set on the basis of the
costs and rate of return requirements of the "representative" pro-
ducer. High-cost producers accordingly receive a lower than normal
rate of return. Low-cost producers receive a higher than normal rate
of return.90
The leading Supreme Court case on group utility rates, The Per-
mian Basin Area Rate Cases, concerned field prices of natural gas for
an entire production area. In upholding the fixing of group prices in
this context, the Court stated that the regulator must have "before it
representative evidence, ample in quantity to measure with appropri-
ate precision the financial and other requirements of the parties."91
What constitutes "representative evidence" and "appropriate preci-
sion," the Court implied, will vary from one context to the next.
92
One factor of overriding importance in determining the required
representativeness and precision of group rates is the fungibility of the
controlled product or service. Natural gas, as the Court noted in Per-
mian Basin, is a highly fungible commodity.93 Gas from one producer
is generally indistinguishable from gas from another. Indeed, gas
from multiple sources is typically intermingled in the pipelines before
it is delivered to consumers. 94
89. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 387-90 (1974); The
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503
(1944).
90. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Pennzoil Producing Co., 439 U.S. 508,
517 (1979); Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 769; Bowles, 321 U.S. at 518.
91. Permian Basin at 769; see also The New England Div. Case, 261 U.S. 184, 196-97
(1923) (holding that when railroad rates are set on a group basis, evidence must be "typical
in character, and ample in quantity, to justify the finding made in respect to each division
of each rate of every carrier").
92. Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 769.
93. See id. at 757.
94. Even so, the Federal Power Commission in Permian Basin set different prices in
different gas producing regions, provided for different prices for different types of gas, and
authorized adjustments from standard prices based on BTU content. Id. at 762-63.
Physician services, in contrast, are not fungible. The quality of
medical care and the diagnostic and therapeutic techniques employed
differ considerably based on the physician's individual training, expe-
rience, and professional judgment. Consequently, group rates of the
type upheld in Permian Basin cannot be transposed without modifica-
tion to the physician services market.
Cases dealing with rent controls are also instructive here. The
Supreme Court has, at least as a wartime measure, sanctioned the use
of group rates in fixing rents,95 and rental housing units are less fungi-
ble than natural gas. The rental stock varies widely in terms of physi-
cal amenities, quality of construction, and degree of maintenance.
Landlord costs will also vary widely, depending on such factors as the
landlord's embedded cost of capital. Recognizing these variables, lo-
cal rent controls almost always reflect a high degree of sensitivity to
individual costs in the structure of controlled prices.96 This sensitivity
is achieved by taking the market's pre-existing structure of rents as the
point of departure and then providing for periodic adjustments based
on an economic index designed to reflect rising costs.97 Beyond this
basic approach, courts have increasingly recognized that rent controls
that remain in effect for any significant period of time will generate
severe distortions in the pricing structure, requiring more frequent ac-
cess to mechanisms for individual adjustments in the rents for particu-
lar structures.98
Physician services are probably even less fungible than rental
housinig. The variables that enter into the valuation of physician serv-
ices are far more numerous and subjective than those that apply to
rental housing. Moreover, the human capital invested in medical
training is probably less transferable to other markets than is (at least
some) rental housing. In these circumstances, any system of physician
price controls must provide, if anything, an even higher degree of dif-
ferentiation than that which is found in the typical rent control statute.
At a minimum, any system of physician price controls would have to
distinguish between different medical procedures, different physician
training levels, and different areas of the country.
95. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 517.
96. For a comprehensive survey of rent control ordinances and cost-adjustment mech-
anisms, see Kenneth K. Baar, Guidelines For Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a
Decade, 35 RUTGERs L. REv. 723 (1983).
97. Id. at 765-81.
98. See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1029-30 (Cal. 1976); Apartment
& Office Bldg. Assoc. v. Washington, 343 A.2d 323,329-31 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975); Helmsley
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There are two distinct models that might satisfy these require-
ments. One is the current Resource-Based Relative-Value Scale
(RBRVS) utilized in Medicare reimbursement. 99 The RBRVS seeks
to construct reasonable physician charges for different medical serv-
ices on the basis of a study of the relative work and complexity in-
volved in providing the services. The extensive research underlying
the RBRVS and the manifold problems associated with its implemen-
tation suggest the highly detailed process necessary to calculate a
properly differentiated system of physician price controls.10°
The other possible model would be a system of controls modeled
after the typical rent control ordinance. This approach would start
with the preexisting structure of physician prices, and then permit pe-
riodic aggregate adjustments based on changes in some index of costs.
These aggregate adjustments would then be supplemented by a mech-
anism for individual exemptions or variances from group prices. As
the experience with rent controls suggests, the longer such a system
remains in effect, the more important provisions for individual exemp-
tions would become.
Whichever model is chosen-the construction of "fair" prices
based on the value of inputs as reflected in the RBRVS, or a freeze in
prices followed by adjustments as reflected in the typical rent control
scheme-the complexity of the process should be evident. The com-
plexity follows directly from the constitutional understanding that
group prices must be based on representative costs, combined with the
fact that physician services are not fungible. If the Takings Clause
applies to physician price controls, if the fair return standard is ap-
plied in implementing the requirements of the Clause, and if the rep-
resentative costs understanding of the group rate cases is adopted in
applying the fair return test, then this complexity is inevitable.
m. Due Process
In addition to assuring that price controls are based on represen-
tative costs, any system of price controls must provide for individual-
ized hearings for physicians who raise legitimate questions of fact
about whether group price controls allow them an opportunity to earn
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (1988); 42 C.F.R. §§ 414.1 to 453 (1993).
100. The unit of the Department of Health and Human Services responsible for imple-
menting the RBRVS, the Health Care Financing Administration, issued proposed rules
establishing initial fee scales for physicians under the RBRVS that take up 186 pages in the
Federal Register. See Medicare Program;" Fee Schedule for Physicians' Services, 56 Fed.
Reg. 25,792 (1991).
a fair return on their investment. This requirement flows not only
from the Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence, but also from consid-
erations of procedural due process.
Price controls are clearly subject to procedural due process con-
straints. A physician's right to practice medicine is a property right
protected by the Due Process Clause.10' A physician could be de-
prived of this right by overly-rigorous price controls. Certainly, any
time price controls are imposed in circumstances where physicians are
denied access to an uncontrolled market such that the Takings Clause
applies, the Due Process Clause would apply as well. 02
A. The Necessity of a Hearing
The first due process question is whether physicians are entitled
to any kind of individual hearing when they are subjected to group
price controls. The Supreme Court has long distinguished between
government action that applies to large numbers of similarly-situated
persons and action that may or may not apply to persons depending
on their individual circumstances. 3 In the former category, proce-
dural due process does not require an individualized hearing."° For
example, an increase in the valuation of all property in a community
would not give rise to individualized hearing rights.'05 In contrast,
when the government takes action that threatens to deprive individu-
als of their property on grounds that are particular to each individual,
due process requires some kind of individualized hearing. °6 Thus, a
proposal to impose a special assessment on a particular parcel of prop-
101. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,121-22 (1889); Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323,
334 (1st Cir. 1992); Keney v. Derbyshire, 718 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir. 1983); see also Barry
v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (occupational license is property for due process purposes);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license is property); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (welfare payments are property).
102. See Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103, 108-09 (1965); Bailey v. Anderson,
326 U.S. 203, 204 (1945).
103. Compare Bi-Metallic Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (no
individual hearing required before across-the-board increase in valuation of all property
implemented) with Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (individual hearing
required before determining "whether, in what amount, and upon whom" a special assess-
ment for street paving would be imposed).
104. E.g., Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 n.33 (1985); Minnesota State Bd. for Com-
munity Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984); Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445.
105. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445. - •
106. E.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div, v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); United
States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224,244-45 (1973); Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385-
86.
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erty would trigger a right to an individualized hearing on issues of fact
bearing on the proper assessment of that parcel."°7
Whether group price controls give rise to hearing rights under
this distinction is problematic. From what might be called the revenue
perspective, group price controls look like generalized rules of equal
effect: all members of the group must charge and receive the same
prices. But this appearance of uniform treatment is illusory unless the
costs of each member of the group are identical. If the costs or return
requirements of individual members of the group differ, then some
may be denied a fair return on investment if they are subjected to a
single uniform pricing structure. In these circumstances, therefore,
the facts about whether the group price yields a fair return would vary
depending on individual circumstances, indicating that individualized
hearings are required.
The solution to the dilemma that the courts generally have
reached, without any precise rationale or supporting theory, is that
due process does not require an individual hearing concerning the
level at which group rates are fixed, but does require individualized
hearings on requests for exemptions from group rates.10 8 This solu-
tion makes sense, provided the group rates are established on a prop-
erly individuated basis in the first place-that is, prices have been
fixed on the basis of truly representative costs and return require-
ments. Assuming this requirement is met, all persons who are genu-
inely members of the group have no cause for complaint. On the
other hand, anyone who can fairly claim that they do not properly
belong in the group because of their own peculiar circumstances has a
due process right to an individual hearing.
B. Pre- or Post-Deprivation Hearing
The difficult question from the perspective of modem due pro-
cess doctrine is why a post-deprivation hearing would be sufficient
107. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 380-86.
108. See, e.g., The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414,436 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503,519-21 (1944);
150 East 47th Street Corp. v. Creedon, 162 F.2d 206,210 (Emer. Ct. App. 1947). Although
the Due Process Clause does not require individualized hearings before group prices are
fixed, the Administration Procedure Act and traditions of procedural regularity suggest
that consultations with representatives of organized medicine should be held before group
prices are established. Such prior consultations took place in connection with the price
controls in the early 1970s and were emphasized by courts reviewing challenges to that
price-setting process. See Western States Meat Packers Ass'n v. Dunlop, 482 F.2d 1401,
1404 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973); Pacific Coast Meat Jobbers Ass'n v. Cost of Living
Council, 481 F.2d 1388, 1391 (Temp. Emer. Ct:.App. 1973).
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when one claims a right to be exempted from group rates. The gen-
eral rule of due process today is "that an individual be given an oppor-
tunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property
interest."'1 9 The Court recently enforced this rule in the context of a
civil forfeiture proceeding, where the property right at issue was the
loss of $900 a month in rental income, which the Court characterized
as "a significant portion of the exploitable economic value" of the de-
fendant's home." 0 The same could easily be said of price controls
that threaten to deprive a physician of a fair return on specific assets
in the form of human capital.
To be sure, pre-deprivation hearings are not always required.
The general standard, set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,"' requires
that courts balance the public and the private interests involved, as
well as the likely value of the procedures, in determining whether pre-
or post-deprivation hearings are required and, if required, what their
elements should be."' The individual interest here-the physician's
interest in protecting the value of his investment-is obviously sub-
stantial. The question is whether there is a sufficient off-setting inter-
est in postponing consideration of individual claims of exemption.
The World War II era price control cases, which sustained a post-dep-
rivation exemption procedure, placed great weight on the fact of war-
time emergency and the need to act promptly to stem inflationary
pressures caused by the shock of sudden changes in demand." 3 These
factors are not plausibly present with respect to physician price con-
trols during an otherwise noninflationary era. But the older cases also
stress "the disorganization which would result if enforcement of price
orders were delayed or sporadic or were unequal or conflicting in dif-
ferent parts of the country.' ' " 4 And they suggest that where large
numbers of individual producers are involved in a system of group
price controls, it would be impractical to afford every producer an in-
dividualized hearing before controls were instituted. These themes of
uniformity and practical necessity were also picked up and highlighted
in Permian Basin."5
109. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,542 (1985) (quoting Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); accord United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498 (1993); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-66 (1970).
110. James Daniel, 114 S. Ct. at 501.
111. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
112. Id. at 334-35.
113. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 436; Bowles, 321 U.S. at 520-21.
114. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 432.
115. The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968).
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The analytical framework of Mathews, informed by the considera-
tions of uniformity and practical necessity discussed in the group price
control cases, suggests that a post-deprivation hearing on claims of
exemption is permissible. Given the critical effect of price controls on
physician's livelihood, however, Mathews requires at least that every
individual physician be afforded an opportunity to present evidence in
a prompt post-deprivation hearing concerning specific costs of train-
ing and practice and any other individual factors relating to the fair-
ness of being included in a given price control group.
116
C. Necessary Hearing Procedures
Assuming that a post-deprivation hearing is sufficient for due
process purposes, exactly what procedures would be required in such
a hearing? Here the rent control cases provide the best guidance.
Courts reviewing rent control schemes have recognized that the pro-
cedure for individualized adjustments must be an expeditious one. As
the California Supreme Court observed:
It is clear that if the base rent for all controlled units were to
remain as the maximum rent for an indefinite period many or
most rent ceilings would be or become confiscatory. For such
rent ceilings of indefinite duration an adjustment mechanism is
constitutionally necessary to provide for changes in circum-
stances . .. The mechanism is sufficient for the required pur-
pose only if it is capable of providing adjustments in maximum
rents without a substantially greater incidence and degree of de-
lay than is practically necessary.
17
The New Jersey Supreme Court has offered more detailed gui-
dance as to what constitutes an adequate adjustment mechanism.
Such a mechanism is one that (1) processes applications for adjust-
ments expeditiously (in no more than two to four months); (2) pro-
vides for enhanced revenues to offset the consequences of regulatory
lag or delay; (3) provides clear and precise criteria for awarding ad-
justments; (4) permits applications to be processed at minimal cost to
the applicants; and (5) assures that similarly situated applications for
116. See id. at 772 (finding no reason "to suppose that petitions for relief [from area
rates] will not be expeditiously evaluated.").
117. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1030 (Cal. 1976); accord Helmsley v.
Borough of Fort Lee, 394 A.2d 65, 86 (N.J. 1978) (stating that rent control ordinance must
protect landlords' interests "by providing prompt, fair, and efficacious administrative re-
lief"); see also Apartment & Office Building Ass'n v. Washington, 343 A.2d 323 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1975) (rent control regulations must include a mechanism for passing through in-
creased costs to tenants).
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adjustments are treated alike."' Similar factors are relevant in estab-
lishing the requisite elements of a post-deprivation adjustment mecha-
nism under any system of physician price controls. A highly
expeditious exemption procedure is one way to assure that price con-
trols do not deny physicians a fair return. If expedition cannot be
achieved, then some mechanism must be provided for recovering rev-
enues to offset the effects of delay in cases where an exemption is
ultimately granted.
IV. Identifying Physician Price Controls
Price controls that single out one profession are obviously unpop-
ular with those subject to the controls. They are also controversial
because of the widespread conviction among economists and policy
analysts that they are at best futile, and at worst destructive of innova-
tion and quality in health care.119 Given the opposition to price con-
trols, it is perhaps not surprising that controversy has erupted over
whether specific health reform proposals do or do not amount to price
controls.' 20 Little purpose would be served by attempting in a law
review article to classify specific proposals as either constituting price
controls or something else. Cost containment proposals proliferate
and permutate too rapidly to make analysis of any particular propos-
als worthwhile. What can and should be attempted, however, at least
in a preliminary fashion, is a discussion of the general criteria that
should be employed in determining whether a specific proposal does
in fact call for price controls subject to the Takings Clause.
A. The Threshold Questions
Here, a two-part inquiry seems advisable. The first inquiry is
whether a proposal calls for government action that causes prices to
fall or to rise less rapidly. This inquiry, in turn, can be broken down
into two subsidiary questions: (1) whether there is governmental ac-
tion, and (2) whether that action causes a moderation in the rise of
prices. The first question is the conventional inquiry into whether
118. Helmsley, 394 A.2d at 79-80.
119. Peter Passell, The Dangers of Declaring War on Doctors, N.Y. TIMiEs, Mar. 21,
1993, at C5.
120. See Milt Freudenheim, Drug Companies Feeling Pressure of Clinton's Plan to Keep
Their Prices Down, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 30, 1993, at A22; Elizabeth McCaughey, She's
Baaackl, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 28,1994, at 17; Robert Pear with Stephen Labaton, Officials
Predict Deluge of Suits on Health Plan, N.Y. Tnvms, Sept. 27, 1993, at Al.
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there is "state action.' 21 The second question is essentially one of
determining causation. 22
The state action question is easy if the challenged action is di-
rectly commanded by federal statute or by a federal regulatory
agency. It is also easy if the action is ordered by a purchasing cooper-
ative or "health alliance" that is organized as an agency of either the
federal or a state government.123 The question starts to become close
if the "alliances" are organized not as governmental agencies, but as
non-profit corporations. The Supreme Court has indicated that state
action will be found "if the State creates the legal framework gov-
erning the conduct, if it delegates its authority to the private actor, or
sometimes if it knowingly accepts the benefits derived from unconsti-
tutional behavior."" Very likely each of these circumstances would
be present with respect to the proposed health alliances, whose com-
position, powers, and duties are spelled out in great detail in the draft
legislation. 25 If final legislation is enacted that bears a significant re-
semblance to these proposals there is little doubt that the health alli-
ances would be state actors for purposes of the Constitution, even if
organized as non-profit corporations. 26
The causation question may also be easy or difficult, depending
on the circumstances. Obviously, if a government actor (Congress, a
national health board, or a regional alliance) directly fixes physician
prices, as the Administration bill proposes for fee-for-service physi-
cians, 27 then the causation question is easy. The more difficult issues
121. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
122. All this is fairly conventional. As the Supreme Court has stated in the context of
determining municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,-the "proper analysis" requires a
court to determine "(1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation,
and (2) if so, whether the [government] is responsible for that violation." Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (1992).
123. The Administration's proposed legislation states that regional health alliances are
to be established as either "a non-profit organization, an independent state agency, or an
agency of the State .... " Health Security Act, supra note 6, § 1301.
124. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 182.
125. Health Security Act, supra note 6, §§ 1301-1394.
126. Cases involving investor-owned public utilities, which exercise far less governmen-
tal power than the health alliances, support this conclusion. See PUC v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451 (1952) (finding state action where transit company derived its powers from Congress,
exercised a "substantial monopoly" over transit services, and was subject to regulatory
supervision of public utility commission and commission had refused to set aside conduct
in question); see also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (noting that
whether entity has "something of a governmentally protected monopoly" relevant to in-
quiry, but finding no state action where state does not place its "imprimatur" on the chal-
lenged practice).
127. See supra note 6.
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arise with respect to proposals for "managed competition," "global
budget constraints," and other proposals for structural changes in the
delivery of health care services. Not every government action that
affects the structure of the marketplace, and hence prices, can be said
to cause price constraints. The antitrust laws are an example. The
fact that the federal government prohibits price fixing by manufactur-
ers of widgets may affect the price of widgets, but no one would sug-
gest that the antitrust laws are the cause of whatever prices we
observe being negotiated in the widget market. On the other hand, if
the government were to establish a monopoly agent for all sales of
widgets, there can be little doubt that the government-created monop-
olist would be regarded as causally responsible for a rise in prices
(although the exact magnitude of the price rise would be a function
both of restricted supply-which the monopolist would control-and
the level of demand-which presumably would be independent of
government control). The same analysis should be applied to struc-
tural changes that take the form of a government-created monopsony
purchasing agent for physician services. Thus, if regional alliances are
set up to exercise what amounts to monopoly power, the prices they
impose should be regarded as controlled prices for constitutional
purposes.
B. Determining if the Takings Clause Is Implicated
Assuming that governmental action causing a moderation in price
changes is identified, the second general question would be whether
these price controls trigger scrutiny under the Takings Clause. This is
the inquiry discussed in Part I of this Article. The key question is
whether the price controls are imposed in such a way that physicians
are effectively denied access to an uncontrolled market. Physicians
denied access to an uncontrolled market have specific capital at risk
and are entitled to the protection of the Takings Clause.
Obviously, not every government action that establishes or con-
strains physician prices will trigger Takings Clause scrutiny under this
standard. When the Veterans Administration sets salaries for attend-
ing physicians at V.A. Hospitals, no Takings Clause issue is presented
because this price-setting action does not foreclose any physician from
obtaining access to a market where compensation is not fixed by the
government. On the other hand, if the government divides the market
between group-care physicians and fee-for-service physicians, and
subjects group-care physicians to a monopsony purchasing agent,
while directly setting fees in the other segment of the market, there
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can be little doubt that physicians have been denied access to an un-
controlled market.
In short, the relevant inquiry is not so much a matter of seizing
upon the correct verbal definition of "price controls." Instead, the
questions should be: First, has the government acted to constrain phy-
sician prices? And second, has the government closed off virtually all
avenues of escape from its regime of constrained pricing? Affirmative
answers to these questions should trigger the Takings and Due Process
Clauses limitations discussed in this Article, whether or not the gov-
ernment action has been given any particular label.
Conclusion
In considering legislation intended to restrict the growth of health
care costs, Congress must keep certain fundamental constitutional
principles in the forefront of its deliberations. First, it must assure
that any price controls are structured to comply with the fair return
standard of the Takings Clause. In the context of the medical profes-
sion, this means that any system of price controls must be tailored to
different medical services, geographic regions, and degrees of physi-
cian training and experience. Second, any system of controls must
also provide an expeditious mechanism for physicians to claim an ex-
emption from group price controls. And third, the Due Process
Clause requires that physicians be afforded individualized hearings on
such requests.
These constitutional constraints are a matter of fundamental fair-
ness to physicians, who have made major sacrifices to develop the
skills and training needed to practice their professions. These sacri-
fices constitute a form of human capital which is not readily transfera-
ble to any other occupation. As result, physicians are vulnerable to
government action that would literally take their investment without
providing just compensation.
These constitutional limits are also important in determining the
ultimate success or failure of health care reform. Any effort to reduce
health care costs by squeezing physician earnings will run up against
the constitutional constraints imposed by the Takings and the Due
Process Clauses. Even if no court ever strikes down particular con-
trolled prices, these constitutional constraints will exact a major toll in
the form of the administrative costs of assuring that this does not hap-
pen. Obviously, dollars spent on public-utility style rate hearings and
hearings on requests for individual variances will not improve the
quality of health care or make access to health care more equitable.
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The substantial costs of complying with the constitutional limits on
physician price controls thus provide another reason-if one is
needed-for leaving price controls out of health care reform.

